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The textbook economists' model of a tradable permit system cannot usually be 
applied perfectly at either the domestic or international scale because of the difficulty 
and/or expense of defining allocations to and monitoring emissions of some groups, as 
well as for political reasons.  It may be impossible to bring these groups fully into a 
tradeable permit system but it is often possible to find compromise solutions to gain some 
benefits from trade.  This paper explores this problem in the context of the Joint 
Implementation mechanism associated with the Kyoto Protocol.  This paper starts by 
outlining the current international rules governing Joint Implementation.  We provide a 
summary of key jargon for those who are unfamiliar with the complex Kyoto language.  
We then discuss two key international issues that are still unresolved:  baseline 
development and monitoring.  We then turn to domestic governance of Joint 
Implementation and how the private sector might engage in Joint Implementation.  At 
this point we consider how Joint Implementation fits within the suite of Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms, why sellers and buyers might choose to engage in each, and how the 
different mechanisms might interact in the market for tradeable units.  We conclude with 
some thoughts about productive directions for future research.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The textbook economists' model of a tradable permit system cannot usually be 
applied perfectly at either the domestic or international scale because of the difficulty 
and/or expense of defining allocations to and monitoring emissions of some groups, as 
well as for political reasons.
2  It may be impossible to bring these groups fully into a 
tradeable permit system but it is often possible to find compromise solutions to gain some 
benefits from trade:  lower costs of achieving the environmental outcome, greater 
engagement of actors in the overall process, and greater equity by allowing all groups to 
gain some benefit.  A variety of compromise trading models suit different circumstances.   
The Kyoto Protocol limits greenhouse gas emissions in the Annex B
3 
(developed) countries that ratify it.  To reduce the costs of achieving the overall emission 
limits, three trading mechanisms are available:  International Emissions Trading; Joint 
Implementation; and the Clean Development Mechanism.  They all ultimately transfer 
units that can be used for compliance but they are available to different groups in 
different time periods and have different rules.
4  The two key distinctions are first, 
between Annex B (developed countries) and non-Annex B (developing countries), and 
second, based on the quality of domestic emissions monitoring.  Only countries that have 
ratified Kyoto can participate.  Under all mechanisms, trading can be carried out either by 
the government, or by legal entities (companies or individuals) where the government 
devolves this authority.  The government remains ultimately responsible for compliance.   
International Emissions Trading (IET) is the simplest form of emissions trading 
where assigned amount units (AAUs) are simply moved from the registry of one Annex 
                                                           
2 For example in the New Zealand fisheries’ Individual Transferrable Quota market, recreational fishers are 
not included directly but do share the total allowable catch.  In the US nitrous oxide program, large 
stationary sources are generally included in the state level trading programs but other sources can opt in.   
3 Parties assuming quantified emission reduction or limitation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are 
identified in Annex B of the Protocol.  These are the same as Annex I countries so we use the terms 
interchangeably. 
4 The different tradeable units are assigned amount units (AAUs) that are allocated to all Annex B states, 
emission reduction units (ERUs) created in Joint Implementation, certified emission reductions (CERs) 
created through the Clean Development Mechanism and removal units (RMUs) that are created through 
land use change in Annex B countries.  For convenience in this paper we refer to the group as 'units'.  We 
also use the term 'credit' to refer to units created through JI or CDM projects or through domestic projects.   
1  
B country to another.
5  This is available from 2008 onward.  Countries that sell using this 
mechanism must have shown that they have adequate monitoring and enforcement of 
emissions (compliance with Articles 5 and 7
6) so that sales reflect real reductions in 
emissions.   
Joint Implementation (JI) is available to all Annex B countries.  It is a project-
based mechanism where reductions are established by comparison with an estimated 
'baseline' (what would have happened without the project) rather than relative to the 
national emission limits set in Kyoto.  Emission reduction units (ERUs) can be created 
from 2008 onward.
7  It does not require good national level monitoring.  It has high 
transaction costs because all projects must be internationally approved.
8  Thus the main 
sellers should be countries that cannot engage in IET because their monitoring is 
inadequate.  This is likely to be primarily economies in transition.   
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is available to sellers from 
developing countries only.  The sources of emission reductions are somewhat limited 
(especially with regard to land use emissions).  Like JI, it is project based and each trade 
requires international approval.  In this case approval is needed because the seller 
countries do not face emissions limits so reductions can be measured only relative to 
agreed project baselines.  Certified emission reductions (CERs) can be created from 2000 
onward for use after 2008.   
Thus JI fills a specific niche in the international greenhouse gas trading market.  
It has a range of benefits for both buyers and sellers.  JI allows Parties that lag in 
developing their domestic climate institutions, and hence cannot participate in IET, to 
host projects and receive the benefits from trade.  We focus most on these Parties.  They 
                                                           
5 For detailed discussion of international emissions trading see Kerr ed. (2000). 
6 For discussion of the monitoring and enforcement requirements involved in Articles 5 and 7 see Hargrave 
et al (2000). 
7 Decision 16/CP.7 of the Marrakesh Accords clearly establishes that JI projects can start as early as 2000, 
but that ERUs can be issued only for a crediting period starting after the beginning of 2008.  
8 The high transaction costs may be only in Track II JI – see below.  Throughout this paper, and in contrast 
to some international discussion, transaction costs are simply the cost per transaction or trade.  They do not 
include the fixed costs of creating regulatory infrastructure either domestically or internationally.  They 
also do not include the real cost of reducing emissions.   
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need to use a particular form of JI, called ‘Track II’.
9  In contrast, Track I JI is very 
similar to IET so we cover it only briefly.   
Under JI, selling entities, those who reduce emissions, can make profit if they 
sell the ERUs for more than it cost to create them.  These include receiving credit; 
technology transfer and learning if the buyer is actively involved in the project; and 
learning more broadly about how trading programs work, which will help them in future.  
Selling countries economically benefit if their companies engage in environmentally 
sound, profitable sales.  In addition, some projects will help develop monitoring 
infrastructure, such as databases, that will facilitate the seller country's move toward the 
more efficient trading mechanism IET.  For example, many countries may not have 
accurate data for national coal use, which is essential for estimating national emissions.  
The organisers of a JI project that covers the major coal users may collect data that help 
address this gap.  The technology transfer and learning embedded in JI projects may help 
move the country from a high emissions path toward a less greenhouse gas (GHG) 
intensive path, which will make compliance with future targets easier.  This is an issue of 
particular concern to some Annex B countries with transitional economies that may have 
difficulty satisfying the international monitoring requirements, Articles 5 and 7, by 2008.   
JI is not an 'aid' program.  The buyers primarily participate because they gain 
benefits from the lower AAU prices.  The option of JI also offers investors security that 
they can acquire ERUs even if the seller or ‘host’ Party fails to meet its Article 5 and 7 
requirements.  They also might gain ancillary commercial benefits.  A JI project might 
give a company the chance to form a joint venture with a company in a country in 
transition by reducing undue regulatory barriers.  This can provide learning opportunities 
and market access.  Countries whose companies buy ERUs gain direct benefit because 
their companies comply at lower cost and expand their market opportunities.  They might 
also gain in the longer term from better access to AAUs from those countries through 
established relationships, and from better monitoring systems, which will make those 
countries more effective partners in global cooperation on climate change.  Countries that 
are neighbors of economies in transition with serious local air pollution problems could 
                                                           
9 We discuss why Parties would end up using Track II JI in section 5.1.1. 
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gain through reduced air pollution if the emissions reductions are associated with 
generally cleaner production.  The European Union could benefit from JI because it could 
help the accession countries meet the European Union's environmental standards.   
The situation with Joint Implementation (JI) is similar to that which arises with 
offsets from small sources within larger trading systems or voluntary opt-in procedures 
for extra sources.  For example in the US Acid Rain program electric utilities were 
brought into the program in two phases but second phase utilities were able to opt in to 
the first phase if they chose.
10  JI probably won't be a major mechanism for long (if Kyoto 
is a success) because it is costly and environmentally more risky than IET with good 
national monitoring.  Studying it is still useful however, as it will probably be important 
up until 2012 and even 2017, and it will offer lessons for the Clean Development 























Key ‘Kyoto’ Jargon for the uninitiated 
Annex I (B) countries: Developed countries that have signed the Protocol and agreed to meet
emission targets. 
COP/MOP:  Conference of the Parties / Meeting of the Parties.  The international
decision-making bodies. 
Article 3:     Specifies that Annex I countries must meet emission reduction targets. 
Article 6:      Creates Joint Implementation 
Articles 5 and 7:    Specify  the  monitoring requirements that Annex I countries must
satisfy before they can participate in international emissions trading. 
IET:       International emissions trading 
JI:      Joint  Implementation 
Track II JI:   The mechanism for Joint implementation when the selling country has
not satisfied Articles 5 and 7  
AAUs:    Assigned Amount Units – their initial allocation is defined by the
Article 3 targets  
ERUs:    Tradeable emission reduction units created through Joint
Implementation 
PDD:       Project Design Document.  This is required for Track II JI. 
AIE:        Accredited Independent Entities. 
                                                           
10 For discussion of the experience with this phase in and with the Acid Rain program more generally see 
Ellerman et al (2000). 
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1.1  What literature is already available on JI? 
Many articles have been written on various aspects of JI.  We do not attempt a 
complete literature survey but provide some key general references that will facilitate 
further exploration.  Literature on specific issues that we cover later is discussed in that 
context.   
A series of excellent early papers present the basic issues in JI and how it links 
to other forms of international trading.  These include Tietenberg et al (1998), Mullins 
and Baron (1997), Nentjes (1994), Ridley (1998), and Hanafi (1998).  Jepma (1995) is an 
edited volume with a wide range of perspectives on JI, which in 1995 still covered trade 
with both developed and developing countries.  Zhang and Nentjes (1999), Bohm (1994) 
and Woerdman (2000) compare JI with a broader trading system such as IET.  Kelly and 
Leining (2000) compares the institutions needed for JI relative to CDM.  Parkinson et al 
(1999) consider the implications of 'interim period banking', or credit for reductions pre-
2008 in both CDM and JI.  Bailey and Jackson (1999) and OECD/IEA/IETA (2002) 
consider issues specific to dealing with economies in transition.   
In this chapter we do not touch on the issue of the potential contribution of JI in 
terms of emissions reductions or its costs.  Most models of global trading can contribute 
some evidence on the potential reductions from JI simply by considering Eastern Europe 
as a region.  See for example various results from the Energy Modeling Forum.
11  Bohm 
and Carlén (1999) report laboratory experiments on JI trading that shed light on how 
actual gains might differ from potential gains.  Institutions whose contributions are well 
worth exploring are the OECD, the International Energy Agency and the Center for Clean 
Air Policy.
12   
1.2  What is the history of JI and how does that affect its future?   
JI began as a part of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), a pilot program 
established in Berlin in 1995.  AIJ covered both developed and developing countries 
(now covered by the CDM).  The pilot phase provided no credit for emissions reductions 
                                                           
11 For example, see Weyant (1999).  
12 Other sources are identified at :  http://unfccc.int/program/coop/aij/wwwbib.html though this is a bit 
dated now. 
  5 
but it had some real value.  A lot of thinking was done about how to define the rules for 
trading.  It introduced the idea of trading to many groups who had never considered it 
before so built a community of interest.  As a result of the projects we learned some 
lessons about monitoring emissions, defining baselines and setting up contracts between 
very different countries with different cultures and institutions.  Many projects illustrated 
the risks involved in what are complex projects with sometimes unreliable or unskillful 
partners.   
On the other hand the pilot phase might have had some negative effects.  There 
was a lot of hype about the potential benefits from involvement but many of the people 
who did get involved learned to their dismay that after considerable investment in project 
design there were few buyers and very low prices.  Some proponents did not seem to 
fully appreciate that there would only be significant demand for credits when emissions 
limitations were enforced and the credits could be used to satisfy those limitations.   
Negative experience with low prices may reduce sellers' future enthusiasm.   
Second, the nature of the projects and the players were probably not 
representative of the types of projects we might expect when real money is involved after 
2008.  The projects tended to be small so methodologies were designed that were suitable 
for small projects rather than tackling larger sectoral projects.  The methodological issues 
in these two cases are very different but larger projects may well be more effective and 
efficient in many countries.  Buyers were involved for either public relations or altruistic 
reasons or because they were interested in learning.  This meant that they were not as 
concerned about commercial aspects so there were fewer incentives to cheat the system.   
Thus important lessons about strategic behavior could not be learned.   
Because there was no credit from these programs there was also limited 
regulation.  This led to widely varying methodologies and widely varying levels of 
environmental integrity; i.e. some projects did not lead to as many real reductions as they 
generated emission credits.  The projects with poor environmental outcomes might have 
increased the skepticism of some environmental groups that oppose trading.   
  6 
The UNFCCC site provides a lot of information about the pilot phase of 
Activities Implemented Jointly and specific projects developed within it.
13  None of these 
project created credits and many were in developing countries so not relevant to JI but the 
list gives a flavor for the type and size of projects that people have experimented with so 
far.  It also gives a clear simple outline of the key issues in project definition; although 
this was written around 1997 these remain the key issues for JI.  They provide a list of 
references that provide an entry point into the extensive grey literature. 
Two major mechanisms have recently been set up to facilitate Joint 
Implementation post 2008:  a buyer program, the Dutch ERUPT program,
14 and an 
international agency program, the Prototype Carbon Fund run as a public/private 
partnership by the World Bank.
15  ERUPT is particularly focused on energy related 
projects in Central and Eastern Europe.  The Dutch government provides the funds and 
seeks emission reduction projects through a tendering process.  The Prototype Carbon 
Fund has been established to demonstrate how JI (and CDM) projects can contribute to 
sustainable development. They are an active market creator, and are dedicated to capacity 
building and sharing information.  No projects have been internationally approved to 
date.   
This paper starts outlining the current international rules governing Joint 
Implementation.  We provide a summary of key jargon for those who are unfamiliar with 
the complex Kyoto language.  We then discuss two key international issues that are still 
unresolved:  baseline development and monitoring.  We then turn to domestic governance 
of Joint Implementation and how the private sector might engage in JI.  At this point we 
consider how Joint Implementation fits within the suite of flexibility mechanisms, why 
sellers and buyers might choose to engage in each, and how the different mechanisms 
might interact in the market for tradeable units.  We conclude with some thoughts about 
productive directions for future research.   
                                                           
13 (unfccc.int/program/coop/aij/) 
14 For details see www.senter.nl/asp/page.asp?id=i000000&alias=erupt 
15 For details see prototypecarbonfund.org. 
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2  CURRENT INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1  International Governance of Joint Implementation 
In the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6 creates the mechanism of Joint 
Implementation (JI).  This Article enables Annex B Parties to meet a portion of their 
Article 3 emission reduction or limitation commitments by transferring or acquiring 
emission reduction units (ERUs) generated in projects in Annex B countries that reduce 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhance anthropogenic removals by sinks.   
In the 2002 Marrakesh Accords, two decisions advanced the development of JI.  
Decision 15/CP.7 reinforces three important principles governing JI.  First, Annex I 
country purchases of JI credits must be in addition to their own efforts to reduce 
emissions rather than simply replacing them; this is known as ‘supplementarity’.  Second, 
JI must maintain the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. JI trades must not 
lead to higher global emissions.  Third, trade in ERUs does not alter commitments in 
Annex B.
16
Decision 16/CP.7 creates detailed draft guidelines for implementing JI.  These 
guidelines are provided as recommendations to the COP/MOP.  If they are accepted, 
through a decision at the first meeting of the COP/MOP following entry into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol, they will become final.  The next section presents an overview of these 
recommendations:  the governing institutions for JI; the project eligibility and participant 
requirements; and the ERU verification, issuance, and carry-over procedures. 
2.1.1 Governing  Institutions 
Under Decision 16/CP.7 the ultimate governing authority for JI is the 
COP/MOP, which has the role of developing the rules, modalities and guidelines for 
implementation.  The COP/MOP also appoints and oversees the Article 6 Supervisory 
Committee (see below).   
                                                           
16 This is included because if future negotiations are conducted in terms of reductions from current Annex 
B commitments, which is not unlikely, and those commitments could be altered through trade, countries 
who sell credits would end up with lower future allocations of credits.   This could deter trade. 
  8 
Both buyer and seller (host) Parties must designate a. The focal point of the 
host Party must confirm that a JI project assists the host country in achieving sustainable 
development.
17  When the host country is in full compliance with its Article 5 and 7 
requirements as well as the recording of its assigned amount and its commitment period 
reserve, the host has the authority to verify and issue ERUs.
 18     
When the host Party is not in full compliance, it can issue ERUs only after the 
Article 6 Supervisory Committee has verified them.
19  This committee manages the 
accreditation of Independent Entities (see below), and can recommend the format of the 
Article 6 Project Design Document (PDD) as well as revisions to the guidelines and 
criteria for baselines and monitoring.  
Accredited Independent Entities (AIEs) are legal entities that fulfill a list of 
operational and competency requirements laid out in Appendix A to the decision.  AIEs 
are tasked with reviewing the PDD prepared by project participants, making it available 
for public comment, determining project eligibility, reviewing the monitoring report, and 
giving recommendations on verifying ERUs.
20,
21
2.1.2  Eligibility of projects and participants 
JI project activities essentially are bound by the same limitations imposed on 
domestic activities under Article 3 and hence IET (e.g., they are restricted to the gases, 
                                                           
17 This does not really have any bite.  The essential thing is that the seller country can control approval of 
sales.  Beyond that, if they do not care about sustainable development there is no mechanism to make sure 
that they require it.  It is also not clear why the buyer country should need to approve the international 
trade.  The buyer government  has complete control over how ERUs are used by companies for compliance 
with any domestic regulation they impose.  If companies want to buy ERUs that cannot be used for 
domestic compliance, why stop them? 
18 The commitment period reserve is the requirement that each Annex B Party must maintain in its national 
registry either 90 percent of its assigned amount or 100 percent of five times its most recently reviewed 
inventory, whichever is lower.  The commitment period reserve is intended to guard against overselling by 
Annex B Parties.  
19 The Supervisory Committee has ten members: three from Annex I Parties with transitional economies, 
three from other Annex I Parties, three from non-Annex I Parties, and one representing the Small Island 
Developing States.  Decisions are made by consensus when possible, and otherwise by a three-fourths 
majority of present and voting members.  
20 Unless someone (Party in the project or 3 members of the Supervisory Committee (SC)) raises an 
objection, then the AIE judgment is automatically accepted by the SC.  If not, then the SC conducts a 
review. 
21 The UNFCCC Secretariat conducts administrative duties.  It records the designated focal points for 
Annex I Parties, maintains the lists of Annex I Parties eligible to participate in JI and AIEs, manages public 
comments on PDDs, and reports the approval of PDDs and the verification of ERUs by AIEs. 
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sectors and source categories listed in Annex A of the Protocol as well as the source and 
sink categories defined in Articles 3.3 and 3.4).
22  Decision 16/CP.7 of the Marrakesh 
Accords, states that Annex I Parties are to “refrain” from using ERUs from nuclear 
facilities to meet their commitments.  This is not really enforceable in IET because AAUs 
are fungible, but it does restrict JI.   
All JI projects must satisfy three criteria:  they must have the approval of the 
Parties involved; the reductions in emissions by sources or enhancement of removals by 
sinks must be “additional to any that would otherwise occur; the acquisition of ERUs 
must be supplemental to domestic actions by Annex I Parties for meeting the Article 3 
commitments.” 
Article 6 enables Annex I countries to authorize their legal entities to engage in 
generating, transferring or acquiring ERUs.
23  The ultimate burden of compliance with the 
Protocol requirements stays with the national government of the Annex I Party.   
2.1.3  ERU Verification, Issuance, and Carry-Over Procedures 
The Marrakesh Accords create a two-track procedure for verifying ERUs as 
follows
24: 
Track I: The first track applies to host Parties that are in compliance with their 
Article 5 and 7 requirements for national inventories, national registries, and reporting.   
These Parties can verify and issue ERUs with no international oversight.  This self-
verification does not undermine the environmental integrity of the Protocol because any 
over-crediting of JI project activities by the host Party will be reflected in the difference 
between the national emissions inventory and the Party’s assigned amount.  Thus, as long 
                                                           
22 In particular JI projects involving forest management, cropland management, grazing land management, 
and revegetation are subject to the restrictions applied under Article 3.4, which include a country-specific 
cap on credited removals by sinks from forest management, and the crediting of the other activities on the 
basis of changes relative to the Party’s base year.    
23 Parties cannot acquire ERUs if they are not in compliance with the national inventory, registry, and 
reporting requirements under Articles 5 and 7 of the Protocol.  The third requirement is unlikely to be 
binding as most buyer countries will be in compliance with Articles 5 and 7 and, if they were not, would be 
unlikely to be interested in buying ERUs as they would be unlikely to be planning to comply with their 
emission limits (they could not prove they were in compliance in any case).  This is a strange limitation.  
Having anyone buy ERUs (or AAUs or CERs), regardless of their status, can only strengthen the agreement 
because it makes the effective cap tighter.  Buying should really be encouraged not limited unless parties 
are concerned with costly overcompliance. 
24 This approach was recommended in Kelly and Leining (2000). 
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as the host Party complies at the close of the first commitment period, then any over-
crediting of JI projects will not represent a liability to the atmosphere, but simply a cost to 
the host Party.  If the Party fails to comply with its commitment, it will face punitive 
measures on that basis and no additional punitive measures specific to JI will be needed.  
It clearly will be in the interest of the host Party to develop domestic procedures for 
project approval, additionality assessment, baseline development, and monitoring that are 
transparent to project participants and that prevent accidental over-crediting of JI project 
activities.  Essentially from an international perspective, Track I ERUs are the same as 
AAUs that a government has agreed to sell but with a different name; i.e. track I JI is 
equal to IET.
25   
Track II: The second track applies to host Parties that do not comply with their 
Article 5 and 7 requirements.  This track provides for independent review of the project 
and verification of the ERUs by AIEs under the oversight of the Article 6 Supervisory 
Committee.
26  Project participants are required to complete a PDD that demonstrates 
Party approval of the project, the additionality of the project, and the inclusion of a 
baseline and monitoring plan in accordance with criteria defined in the Marrakesh 
Accords.
27,
28 No ERUs are created until reductions actually take place and are monitored 
and verified by the AIE. 
This system allows countries to undertake JI projects, but creates appropriate 
safeguards to prevent an unregulated flood of ERUs and AAUs from Annex I countries 
whose noncompliance cannot be detected because they are not properly reporting their 
national inventories.  In addition to these formal mechanisms, there will be pressure from 
civil society to ensure environmental integrity.  The public might punish firms that 
                                                           
25 JI Track I has the probably non-binding disadvantage of a restriction on nuclear activities.  
26 The nuclear power restrictions will bind on this group.   
27 Project participants must document the analysis of the environmental impacts of the project in 
accordance with host country procedures, and must complete an environmental impact assessment if the 
project participants or host country deem it necessary.  These are at the discretion of the Parties. 
28 Once the PDD has been submitted to an AIE, the PDD is made available for public comment for a 30-day 
period.  If the AIE approves the project, it makes its decision and the rationale publicly available.  Project 
approval becomes final 45 days later, unless a Party involved in the project or three members of the 
Supervisory Committee request a review by the Supervisory Committee.  The decision of the Supervisory 
Committee is final.  Project participants can then submit to the AIE a report documenting reduced 
emissions by sources or enhanced removals by sinks in accordance with the approved monitoring plan.  
The verification decision of the AIE is made public, and becomes final 15 days later unless a review is 
requested by a Party involved in the project or three members of the Supervisory Committee.   
  11 
knowingly purchase unsound ERUs (or CERs). Thus it may be in the interest of project 
participants to support domestic and international procedures that build investor 
confidence in the environmental integrity of the ERUs from their projects.     
The Annex I host Party issues ERUs once they have been verified under either 
track described above.
29  Each ERU is labeled according to the specific JI project from 
which it was generated, the host Party, and verification by the host Party or the 
Supervisory Committee.  Once an ERU has been issued, it can be cancelled or retired by 
the host country to meet its commitment, traded through IET, or banked.
30,
31   
Under Decision 16/CP.7, any administrative costs arising from ERU 
verification relating to the function of the Article 6 Supervisory Committee shall be borne 
by both the Parties included in Annex I and the project participants according to a 
decision to be made at COP/MOP1.  In addition, Annex I parties are "invited" to finance 
the administrative expenses for operating JI by making contributions to the UNFCCC 
Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities to facilitate preparatory work by the 
secretariat.    There are some vague provisions also encouraging Annex I countries to 
facilitate the participation in JI by the ‘economies in transition’. 
Thus project participants will probably have to pay some amount toward 
general JI administration by the Supervisory Committee.  Track II participants will need 
to pay fees for ERU verification by an AIE.  Plus it is possible that project participants 
would have to pay fees to their governments' focal points for host country and buyer 
country project approval.  If they (and even the Parties they belong to) do not bear the full 
                                                           
29 The issuance procedure formally consists of the conversion of assigned amount units (AAUs) or removal 
units (RMUs) to ERUs.  An RMU is one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent produced by the 
enhancement removals of sinks under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Protocol.   
30 “Retirement” refers to the units that are applied by the owner Party to meet its national commitment, and 
therefore cannot be carried over or traded to another Party.  “Cancellation” is the term applied to the units 
that need to get destroyed in order to adjust assigned amount for net emissions (if any) under Articles 3.3 
and 3.4. “Cancellation” also refers to the destruction of credits that are found to be invalid for whatever 
reason (fraud, etc.). 
31 Two restrictions are placed on carry-over: Parties can carry over ERUs only to a maximum of 2.5 percent 
of its assigned amount; ERUs converted from RMUs cannot be carried over.  These restrictions are not 
likely to bind, because ERUs, RMUs and AAUs are fungible for compliance purposes.  Parties could retire 
ERUs or RMUs and bank AAUs instead.    
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costs of verifying their project, JI will be more attractive to Parties and project 
participants than is efficient.
32   
The largest outstanding international issue is how to set baselines for projects 
under Track II.  The problem is very similar to the setting of CDM baselines.  We discuss 
this in some detail in the next section.  We also touch on outstanding concerns about 
optimal Track II monitoring. 
3  BASELINES FOR TRACK II JI PROJECTS 
The draft JI agreement specifies that  
 
The baseline for an Article 6 project is the scenario that reasonably represents the 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHGs 
that would occur in the absence of the proposed project.  
and that  
A baseline shall be established: 
(a) On a project-specific basis and/or using a multi-project emission factor; 
(b) In a transparent manner with regard to the choice of approaches, 
assumptions, methodologies, parameters, data sources and key factors; 
(c) Taking into account relevant national and/or sectoral policies and 
circumstances, such as sectoral reform initiatives, local fuel availability, 
power sector expansion plans, and the economic situation in the project 
sector; 
(d) In such a way that ERUs cannot be earned for decreases in activity levels 
outside the project activity or due to force majeure;  
(e) Taking account of uncertainties and using conservative assumptions. 
 
Conceptually this is fine but in reality accurate baselines are extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to create.  Essentially we are trying to predict the future 
behavior of humans in the context of economic changes they do not fully control.  This is 
something we are invariably bad at, and we will never get a chance to observe how well 
we did because the project, by definition, will change behavior.  
If a baseline is set too high (emissions would have been lower than predicted), 
when emissions are actually measured, the difference between baseline and measured 
emissions will overstate the true effect of the project.  This over-rewards participants and 
                                                           
32 The Parties may decide to subsidise the mechanism to faciliate participation by economies in transition.   
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creates an environmental integrity problem; the excess ERUs will be used to allow higher 
actual emissions elsewhere.  In contrast if the baseline is set too low, participants will be 
under-rewarded.  If participants are aware that the baseline is too low when the project 
begins, they might choose not to participate even though they could have reduced 
emissions in a cost-effective way.  If the participants are not aware that the baseline is too 
low, they will find it hard to reduce monitored emissions far below the baseline.  The risk 
of a baseline that is too low raises uncertainty and makes JI projects less attractive.   
Given this impossible task we need to find a satisfactory compromise that 
achieves sufficient accuracy to assure reasonable environmental integrity, minimizes 
random variation, for equity reasons, and particularly avoids the potential for strategic 
bias that rewards less honest people.  The tradeoff is that the baseline must also have 
relatively low cost:  financially, in delays, and in terms of the skills required.  This is 
important because otherwise potential participation in and gains from the program will be 
severely limited. 
OECD (2000) offers an in-depth discussion of these issues and gives some 
suggestions for solutions in specific sectors:  cement, iron and steel, electricity generation 
and energy efficiency.  Fischer (2002) offers an economics-focused assessment of three 
options for baseline setting:  historical emissions, average industry emissions, and 
expected emissions. 
3.1 Methodological  challenges 
3.1.1 Prediction   
Predicting the future is hard.  That said, it is less hard in some situations than 
others.  It is easier in relatively stable sectors and countries.  Predicting emissions in the 
US is much easier than in Russia for both economic and political reasons.  Predicting 
emissions from large utilities is probably (though not always) easier than from the 
renewables sector simply because utilities have been around a long time.  The law of 
large numbers makes prediction more accurate as project scale increases.  Many of the 
idiosyncratic factors that have large effects in small projects will balance each other out 
in a large project.  In a large project, there are fewer avenues for ‘leakage’, where a 
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project affects emissions outside the project, as many are captured within the project (see 
further discussion of leakage under 'monitoring') so estimating a baseline outside the 
project boundaries is less critical.  Short-term predictions can be either less accurate 
because of transient shocks that would smooth out over several years, or more accurate 
because they do not need to deal with unpredictable technology shifts and major policy 
changes.  Thus encouraging larger projects and requiring only medium-term predictions 
(see section below on adjusting baselines) could improve the quality of prediction.   
Baselines will never be perfectly accurate.  Thus we need to trade off the benefits of 
engaging extra actors in the mitigation effort against the environmental risk that JI 
projects impose.
33
3.1.2  Who should create the baseline?  
The draft Annex B decision implicitly assumes that the project participants 
choose their own baseline and then justify it.  This might need to be challenged.  The 
choice of best baseline designer involves two tradeoffs: between knowledge and 
incentives, and between skill and cost.  Those directly involved in the project have the 
best knowledge about what would have happened without the project.  This argues for 
having them involved in the baseline setting process.  However they also have the 
incentive to overstate baseline emissions because they directly profit.  The challenge is to 
elicit their information but not allow it to create bias.  Any non-transparent, non-
replicable analysis provided by the participants (buyer or seller) is unreliable.
34  If in the 
PDD they can be required to provide information that can be cross-checked (in random 
audit), their input will be useful.   
Creating a baseline (particularly using more aggregate approaches) requires 
skills that participants may not have.  This problem can be addressed partly by creating 
standard methodologies and partly by using consultants and AIEs.  There is a tradeoff 
between requiring high quality and controlling cost.  Even consultants can be captured by 
project participants so the methodologies need to be simple so others can understand 
                                                           
33 Not using Track II JI at all is one extreme solution that avoids all environmental risk.  Rentz (1998) 
argues for the other extreme. 
34 This problem is discussed in detail by Wirl et al (1998).   
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them and the information used should be auditable.  Complex models may be more 
accurate when used correctly but they are also more subject to manipulation.
35   
3.1.3 Adverse  selection 
If all baselines were perfect, it would not matter which projects went ahead and 
which did not for environmental integrity.  If, however, there are errors (even if they are 
unbiased over all potential projects) and the project developers can identify the errors 
because they have private information, the errors will lead to systematic bias that will 
harm the environment.  Projects with overly generous baselines will be more likely to be 
done.  The errors will no longer wash out over a large number of projects.  If there are 
errors that no one can predict, project developer behavior will be unaffected and there 
will be no bias.   
3.2 Possible  methodologies 
(i)  Regional/sectoral top-down / bottom-up, or engineering-based, modeled 
baselines;  
For the best long-term, unbiased predictions that minimize leakage, the larger 
the scale the better.  Baselines estimated at a national or regional scale using historical 
data combined with bottom-up modeling offer the least biased and potentially most 
accurate predictions.  These are the type of models that underlie integrated assessment 
models used in developed countries.
36  They are general equilibrium models so control for 
leakage within (and potentially outside) the country.   
To provide detailed bottom-up information for all sources is however 
prohibitively expensive so these models would not to be accurate if applied at the source 
level.  For small projects, these are often of limited value.  The error on each project 
would be unacceptably high and with adverse selection, the degree of bias could be 
considerable.  They might best be used to create regional baselines or baselines for 
specific sectors, while controlling for its interactions with other sectors and regions 
                                                           
35 For more discussion of these issues in the context of deforestation baselines see Kerr et al (2002) 
36 e.g. the Anthropogenic Emissions and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model,  
web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/eppa.html 
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through the general equilibrium model.  If a country can create and monitor a national 
'project', which would make a national baseline useful, it can use IET.
37   
(ii)  Sectoral benchmarking;  
This is a simpler system that tries to balance the benefits of scale with sector-
specific detail without having prohibitively high transaction costs.  Multi-project 
baselines or 'benchmarks' project a business-as-usual emission rate per unit of output 
(e.g., tons CO2/kWh for the power sector, or tons CO2/ton of cement for the cement 
industry) based on aggregated data for a region, sector, project type or technology. 
Individual projects compare their emission rates to the multi-project baseline emission 
rate (OECD/IEA, 2000; Lawson et al, 2000). 
As with any more aggregated baseline a benchmark may have high variance of 
errors for individual projects.  With adverse selection this can create bias in project 
choice and loss of environmental integrity.  Making the benchmark more stringent can 
reduce this problem (Lawson and Helme, 2000), but may come at the cost of loss of 
participation.  On the other hand, the lower transaction costs, relative to project-specific 
baselines, may compensate developers for the greater stringency needed.    
A shortcoming of this approach is that it simply estimates emissions rates.  It 
does not take account of changes in production levels.  Thus it is vulnerable to leakage 
through changes in production levels.  It is appropriate only for projects that focus on 
upgrading technology.  It also leaves open the question of how best to generate the 
baseline from aggregated data.   
(iii) Project-specific;   
These use detailed information and assumptions about plant specific fuel use, 
technology use and output levels over a period of time.  In some ways this is most 
accurate because of the specific detail it uses.  However it suffers from leakage because 
of the small scale, and from potential manipulation by project developers because the 
data are less replicable.  It is also costly because it requires technical capacity and needs 
to be repeated for every project.  Establishing simple standardized methodologies that use 
                                                           
37 In contrast, in the CDM national baselines could allow for national 'projects' or be an input into 
negotiations leading to countries taking on emission limitations.   
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project specific data only where it can be audited can minimize costs and potential for 
manipulation. 
(iv)   Revelation mechanisms?   
An area that deserves more examination is the possibility of creating a 
mechanism that induces unbiased revelation of private information about baselines.  Wirl 
et al (1998) show the incentive to distort baselines in a principal-agent framework and 
show that an exogenous baseline avoids manipulation.  They also illustrate how the 
efficiency loss required to ensure honest revelation in their model sharply reduces the 
predicted emissions reductions that could be achieved through Joint Implementation and 
that those who already have relatively low emissions do most reductions.  Baselines are 
set so low, that many genuinely valuable projects are unprofitable.   
Kerr (1995) shows how private information about both costs of emissions 
reduction, and the risk associated with emissions reduction, can be partially revealed by 
requiring project organizers to choose between a number of contracts that offer a 
combination of a credit price and a total number of credits for the project.  She models 
the situation where a fund tries to maximize reductions from a fixed budget.  Reductions 
that would have happened anyway are simply zero cost reductions.  The result is that 
those who have genuinely high baseline emissions will choose small reduction projects 
with a small number of credits but also a high credit price while those with low baselines 
will choose to have a large number of credits with a low price per credit.  This relies on a 
negative correlation between the average cost of reducing from a given emissions level (a 
higher baseline implies higher costs of reduction from any given level of emissions 
because there are fewer free or cheap ‘reductions’) and the optimal number of emission 
reductions offered.  If a project developer lies about the cost of reducing to a certain level 
of emissions (or equivalently lies about their baseline / marginal abatement cost curve - 
an artificially high baseline lowers the cost of 'reductions'), i.e. says it is high, then they 
are 'punished' by only being able to have a small project.  The appropriate schedule of 
average payment per credit awarded and total contract size induces accurate revelation.  
Different schedules might need to be developed for different countries and sectors.  This 
approach might be applied to setting different rules for small and large projects (see 
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section 3.2.2).  Hagem (1996), Janssen (1999) and Fischer (2002) also consider the issues 
of incomplete information, adverse selection and strategic behavior in Joint 
Implementation. 
Ausubel et al (2003) develop a mechanism to reveal baselines in an auction 
context.
38  They solicit baseline information at the same time as bids by making payments 
dependent on average industry bids as well as the individual's information.  It would be 
interesting to adapt both of these approaches to a trading situation and do empirical work 
to explore how they might be applicable in practice.  If they could be made to work, they 
could produce unbiased baseline predictions but a lot of uncertainty would remain.  This 
uncertainty would be borne by the project participants.      
3.2.1 Updating  baselines 
Over anything other than the immediate future, the main source of error in un-
manipulated baselines will be exogenous changes in technology, and global and local 
macroeconomic and political shocks.  These could quickly lead baselines that are fixed at 
the beginning of the project to be hopelessly inaccurate.  One way to address this problem 
is to update the baseline as information on these shocks is revealed.
39  I n  s o m e  
circumstances this reduces uncertainty for both the international community and the 
project developer (the shocks should affect the baseline and the actual measured 
emissions roughly equally so the updating of the baseline offsets the exogenous shift in 
emissions and reduces total risk).
40  In others there is a tradeoff between imposing risk on 
investors and reducing environmental risk.  
Baselines should be updated only in response to changes that the project 
developers cannot possibly affect. Otherwise updating will invite strategic behavior.   
Benchmarks are a form of updateable baseline because the baseline automatically shifts 
with the level of output.  However output is not exogenous.  If a project developer makes 
good profits from credits on each unit of output, they will have an incentive to inflate 
                                                           
38 This mechanism was developed for the UK emissions trading tender for allowances but was not used.   
39 This approach has been proposed in CDM through the use of 'growth baselines' that adjust to GDP 
growth.  
40 The effect of baseline updating on uncertainty is often misconceived because people forget that the 
shocks on baselines and actual emissions are correlated.  Several papers state that updating baselines 
increases uncertainty for project organisers.   
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output inefficiently thus increasing total emissions and raising the overall cost of 
emission reductions (Fischer 2001).  The benchmark emission rates could themselves be 
updated by using data on emissions rates in parts of industry that are not involved in 
climate change regulation.  As more and more countries and companies are involved in 
regulation however, this updating would become less accurate.
41  The formula by which 
baselines will be updated needs to be defined clearly in advance to reduce uncertainty and 
avoid difficult ex-post negotiations. 
3.2.2  Transaction costs and participation:  Different rules for small projects? 
The CDM has a 'fast track' to facilitate participation by those who offer small 
projects.  The rules are less stringent.  Is this appropriate?  Not in general.  In expectation, 
there is at least as much environmental risk from a large number of small projects as from 
one large project.  If all are equally biased, the total environmental integrity loss will be 
the same.  If the rules can be made less stringent for small projects, they should also be 
able to be less stringent for large projects.   
One legitimate reason for a difference in rules is a desire to stimulate 
participation by groups who can offer only small projects.  This could be either for equity 
reasons or to engage these groups so they can participate more fully in future.  These 
projects could lead to learning and technology development.  If this is the justification, 
the relaxed rules should not be for small projects per se but for specific types of projects 
offered by specific types of groups regardless of the project size.  Otherwise large 
projects might be broken into small parts to fit the rules.  This mistake should not be 
repeated in Joint Implementation. 
If 'small' can be defined in terms of the number of credits gained relative to the 
total level of emissions, and companies that would genuinely have high emissions in the 
baseline case also find it more expensive and difficult to create a project that will move 
them to very low emissions, then it might be possible to offer 'small' projects more 
generous baselines without tempting those who want to produce large numbers of credits 
to participate.  This would be an application of the ideas on revelation mechanisms.  
                                                           
41 There would both be technology leakage from the regulated sectors, price leakage and bias because the 
companies and countries excluded from regulation would not be a random sample.   
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Whether it could be applied is partly an empirical question about the correlation between 
high baseline emissions and 'small' optimal projects.   
3.2.3  Baselines and limitations that are stricter than BAU 
A strange baseline setting problem arises in Joint Implementation and nowhere 
else.  It primarily affects countries whose emissions limitations are strictly binding.  Even 
if the economy were saturated by projects that reduced emissions relative to business as 
usual, the country might still not be in compliance.  Some rule has to be set to allocate the 
nationally required emission reductions across projects.  This could be in the form of 
emissions limitations (e.g.: allowances that are tradeable or not) beyond which JI credit 
can be earned.  Alternatively the government takes on the cost of making the national 
reduction.  In the symmetric case, countries with non-binding limitations, where 
governments need to allocate the rewards from 'hot air', most people assume that 
governments will capture these gains.   
3.3 Monitoring   
Under the international rules described above, AIEs approve a monitoring plan 
and actual monitoring reports before they verify ERUs.  The draft JI decision is clear on 
the need to collect and archive data and have quality control processes for monitoring.  
The method of monitoring is not completely specified yet however.  OECD/IEA (2002) 
discuss monitoring and leakage in detail.  As with baselines, project implementers have 
the best information, however they have an incentive to understate actual emissions to 
increase their rewards.  Hargrave et al (2000) discuss the problems that arise with 
national level monitoring and propose possible solutions.  Many of these insights apply to 
individual JI projects as well.   
Basically there is a choice between deterrence and prevention.  If deterrence is 
used, all information and methods used in the monitoring plan must be documented and 
auditable but auditing could involve considerable effort.  Then projects should be 
randomly audited and those (and their AIEs) that are found to have misled the 
Supervisory Committee should be punished.  This allows detailed monitoring that 
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accurately matches true emissions.  It depends on being able to impose credible severe 
penalties. 
At an opposite extreme, the monitoring process could be made much more 
transparent so that cheating is avoided.  This requires the use of simple standardized 
methodologies and readily observable verifiable information.  Third parties could check 
all project reports quickly before the ERUs are verified.  The advantage of this is that 
cheating is completely avoided.  The disadvantage is that the simplicity required is likely 
to make the measurement of emissions much more inaccurate.  This imposes uncertainty 
on project participants who could make certain reductions but then receive a different 
number of credits.  The participants would probably redirect their efforts to create 
measurable reductions rather than real reductions so some efficiency is lost.  The ideal 
solution is probably somewhere between these two extremes with elements of both.  One 
option is to have a simple default process but make detailed audits voluntary.  This would 
reduce participant’s uncertainty and redirection of effort but would induce environmental 
bias because only those who expect to gain credits through the detailed audit would 
volunteer.  Fines are limited at an international level so simple monitoring should 
probably be emphasized.   
Ideally the process of monitoring JI projects should help countries build the 
monitoring infrastructure to meet their Article 5 and 7 commitments and simultaneously 
create domestic programs that allow them to evolve toward efficient regulation and use of 
IET.  Thus applying the methods required by IPCC best practice guidance for national 
inventories to individual projects wherever possible would be sensible. 
3.3.1 Leakage   
Not only the effects within the project boundary (directly controllable by the 
participants) but also the indirect effects their actions have outside must be measured to 
assess the true environmental effect.  The effects outside are called 'leakage'.  For 
example a project that increases the efficiency of cars will directly reduce emissions but 
indirectly, by lowering the cost of driving, might lead car owners to drive more and even 
purchase more cars.  The severity of leakage will depend on the project but could be 
large.    
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Assessing leakage requires monitoring emissions outside the project and also 
estimating a baseline for those emissions.  Leakage can be assessed by using theory to 
identify paths of effect,
42 informed judgments on their relative importance, data on the 
scale of relevant variables (how many cars are there and how much do people drive now) 
and estimates of relevant elasticities.  Ex-post, monitoring information could be used to 
assess the extent of leakage (for example updating the number of cars actually affected 
and the real price of gasoline).  The baseline could be determined explicitly or implicitly 
by using a model of emissions generation and assuming which key variables are affected 
by the project and to what extent.  The appropriate baseline depends on the form of 
monitoring – it needs to be consistent.  Project participants may have some information 
on the type and scale of leakage, but they have incentives to understate any leakage that 
would reduce the credits created and overstate any positive effects.  They will not provide 
unbiased information. 
In relative terms, increasing the scale/scope of the project reduces the leakage 
problem because more effects are captured within the project.  In absolute terms of course 
a larger project might create more leakage.
43   
4  NON-INTERNATIONAL ISSUES:  DOMESTIC 
GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
4.1  Domestic governance of JI 
A country that engages in JI is essentially allowing the project to sell some of 
its AAUs.  If it complies with Articles 5 and 7, it is concerned with maximizing the value 
of the AAUs it holds and, hopefully, with compliance with its targets.  The country needs 
to be sure that it is getting good value in return for the project.  If the project is freeing up 
AAUs through genuine reductions the government does not lose any AAUs on net.  If 
however the project is over-rewarded, the government loses.  It either has fewer AAUs to 
sell through IET, or it has to buy more AAUs to comply.  These countries will have a 
                                                           
42 Geres and Michaelowa (2002) discuss qualitative effects of leakage.   
43 However projects are designed, leakage of effects to non-Annex I countries through relocation of 
economic activity and changes in the terms of trade is always a problem.  This leakage arises with or 
without trading but is probably reduced by trading because the costs of emission reduction are lower. 
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keen interest in the quality of the international approval process and may want to add 
additional layers of supervision if they are unsure.  Their JI office will be a control point 
and they probably won't want to completely delegate power to trade to legal entities.   
The exception to this will be where the government has a domestic emissions 
permit system (tradeable or not) and it is confident about their level of enforcement and 
that there is no domestic hot air within its system.  In this case it can be confident that any 
sales of permits outside the country will correspond to a tighter cap and hence lower 
emissions inside the country.  In this case it could devolve trading responsibility to legal 
entities and simply act as a rubber stamp. 
If the country is not able to comply with Articles 5 and 7, then it cannot sell 
'hot air' and may not have any concerns about compliance with targets.
44  The AAUs it 
holds have no obvious value to it.  In this case its only concern with the project might be 
to do with its domestic effects: technology transfer, foreign investment, environmental 
effects….  These effects could be addressed through existing regulations relating to these 
issues.  The country may however be interested in promoting Joint Implementation 
projects because they might bring in revenue, technology and transfer of skills.  The 
country’s JI office might be focused on marketing rather than control.   
Thus the countries that are most likely to sell through JI are least concerned 
about the approval process.  Even countries that are not in compliance with 5 and 7 may 
however see this as a transitional phase.  They may want to use Joint Implementation to 
reduce their future emissions by changing technology, to increase information about firm 
emissions and to evolve toward a situation where they do comply with 5 and 7 and can 
have effective domestic regulation.  Whether JI is the best way to achieve this is a serious 
question.  If JI is project based while national inventories are top-down (i.e. calculated 
from aggregate national data on production and trade flows), JI might not help build 
monitoring systems that much.  If the government is thinking of moving toward a tax on 
fossil fuels (at the producer/importer level) or an upstream tradeable permit system, JI has 
                                                           
44 ‘Hot air’ is AAUs that were allocated in Annex B countries but that are not needed for domestic 
compliance even when the country makes no effort to control emissions.  The hot air arises primarily 
because of the unanticipated severity of the economic collapse in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union.   
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few lessons to offer.  JI might lead inexorably toward cumbersome facility level trading 
and regulatory systems.  
Buyers, including buyer countries, are not internationally liable for the quality 
of the credits they buy internationally.  Therefore they should have no legal concern 
about approving a purchase of JI credits.  A rubber stamp should be sufficient.  The only 
exception to this would be if, for political reasons the government wants to limit the 
purchase of ERUs and also select which ERUs will be purchased.
45  This could arise for 
example if they want to use purchases of ERUs to reward (or punish) some countries for 
cooperation (or not) on other issues, or if they have a domestic constituency that objects 
on environmental or other grounds to purchases of ERUs from certain sources and 
countries.
46   
If for whatever reason a country wants to engage extensively in JI it might 
want to reduce transaction costs by establishing bilateral arrangements with buyer 
countries to encourage investment.  If buyers are concerned about the quality of ERUs for 
domestic reasons these bilateral agreements might provide some efficient quality 
assurance.  The seller government might also provide some services to potential investors 
to reduce the costs of producing a Project Design Document.  They might even want to 
facilitate sector-wide projects that could have much lower transaction costs relative to the 
ERUs they create.   
4.1.1  European Union issues 
Some interesting baseline issues are raised by the advent of the European-
Union-wide GHG trading system and the accession of central and Eastern European 
countries to the European Union (EU).
47  It is not clear how the EU will allocate emission 
allowances to the accession countries that will potentially be eligible to join the trading 
system as of 2005.  The trading allowance allocation system being recommended for 
industries in Western European countries is based in part on business as usual and, after 
2008, will need to be tied in some way to the overall EU commitments under Article 3.  It 
is not clear how hot air will be treated in this case. 
                                                           
45 If they simply wanted to limit purchases they could run a first-in-first-served system.   
46 Discrimination of this type could raise WTO issues but it is not clear.   
47 Some of these issues are discussed in van der Gaast (2003). 
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In the case that they did not join the EU trading system, it is not clear whether 
Track II JI baselines for accession countries would be tied to EU standards if accession 
countries are required to meet those EU standards for environmental performance.  This 
could significantly reduce the perceived benefit of investing in JI projects in accession 
countries.  Accession countries that did not join the EU trading system but do comply 
with 5 and 7 would certainly be able to trade their hot air outside the EU.  These countries 
could self-certify their JI baselines so their baselines would not have to meet EU 
standards for environmental performance.   
4.2  Contract design between buyers and sellers 
A contract for ERUs could be as simple as a purchase contract, where the price 
and timing of delivery and payments are the only issues, or as complex as a joint venture.  
Many commentators on JI assume that the buyer is an investor involved with the project 
from the start.  In some cases this might be efficient because the buyer might bring 
technology and skill to the project.  In others the potential seller might be able to contract 
for the technology separately or purchase it locally and may have plenty of skill.  Not all 
projects require very advanced technology.  Foreign investment and particularly joint 
ventures are complex to organize and the extra lure of ERUs might not overcome the 
barriers that often limit such projects.   
Where the contract is a simple purchase contract, the buyer will want to pay on 
delivery to ensure performance while the seller might want the money in advance to ease 
credit constraints and facilitate the investment needed to achieve the emission reductions.  
Compromises between these desires might affect the price paid.   
If the contract is a joint venture it will need to deal with financial and in-kind 
contributions by both parties, sharing of profits and ERUs (these are fungible if there is a 
market for ERUs), and risk sharing.  The investor may not be interested in being the 
ultimate user of the ERUs; they may simply see them as another product.  As JI becomes 
more valuable and hence more commercial, the usual contracting risks will arise and the 
usual problems of less capable actors being exploited by more capable ones (in which 
ever country these are) will arise.  If buyers are systematically more informed and have 
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access to better contracting advice, they may bargain more effectively and gain more 
from the contract.  This is no different from any other interaction among unequal 
commercial players.   
The possibility of joint ventures is also not unique to JI.  Under IET companies 
might still find it worthwhile to form joint ventures for specific projects in countries that 
can reduce emissions effectively with some technological input.  Depending on the form 
of domestic regulation, their reward would be designated in either lower regulatory 
burdens or taxes or in AAUs that they can sell.  The only reason there would be any 
difference between investor behavior under JI and IET would be if a seller government 
chose to give special regulatory treatment to investors that engage in JI, thus making 
investment easier.  There is no obvious reason for seller governments to do this however.   
5  COMPARISONS BETWEEN MECHANISMS 
5.1  Joint Implementation and International Emissions Trading 
5.1.1  When would a seller choose to use Track II JI rather than IET? 
This is a two-step question.  First, will the country be able to use IET?  Second, 
if they can, how great are the benefits relative to using JI?  As with most two-step 
problems, it is easiest to think about the second question first.   
5.1.1.a  How great are the benefits from using IET rather than Track II JI? 
The factors that affect the relative attractiveness of IET (or Track I JI) versus 
Track II JI include: the net benefits from allowing trade from a non-project based 
domestic regulatory system, the transaction costs of using the international Track II 
accreditation process relative to a domestic process, the likelihood that commitment 
period reserve restrictions will bind; and the effect of using Track II accreditation on 
public perceptions of the environmental integrity of the trade.   
1  Net benefits from trading non-project-based units 
(i)  Gains from international trade derived from non-project-based regulation  
IET allows trading of AAUs that are not needed for compliance.  They do not 
have to be associated with any specific regulation or project.  This is immediately 
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relevant for countries with hot air.  Hot air can be legally traded under IET but not under 
JI because of the additionality requirement. It is also directly relevant for countries that 
can make reductions through the use of nuclear energy; these reductions cannot be traded 
under JI.  It will also be relevant for countries with significant real potential to reduce 
emissions at low cost.  If a country has a relatively generous target under Article 3 and 
relatively inefficient current use of fossil fuels (or high but controllable emissions of 
other GHGs) they could potentially be a large seller if they have efficient domestic 
regulation.    
Any efficient regulation will need to go beyond small projects so the country is 
likely to want to be able to trade reductions from policies such as emissions trading, 
emissions taxes, promotion of energy efficiency, building standards, transport policies, 
and strategic infrastructure investments.  If a country thought these policies might be used 
to exactly achieve Article 3 compliance but no more, it could allow any credits from 
projects that go beyond the effects of broad government policies to be sold.  Thus broad 
policies would be used domestically but all international trading would be through 
projects.  This would be hard to judge and implement however.   
Another common reason why countries might want to allow flexible entity-
level trading based on broad policies, even if they are unlikely to be a large net seller (or 
may even be a net buyer), is if they want to use a domestic emissions trading system.  
They might want to avoid the problems of market power or lack of liquidity that can arise 
in a small country.
48  They might also want to automatically link the stringency of their 
domestic system to the international market by allowing free trade and price equalization 
across systems.
49   
(ii)  Domestic regulatory set-up costs 
The domestic regulatory costs of a project-based trading mechanism under 
either IET or Track I JI are identical.  There is no reason to use different rules.  Thus here 
we focus on the differences between IET and Track II JI.   
                                                           
48 For discussion of market power in international trading markets see Kerr (2000b).  Market power has 
been exacerbated by the withdrawal of the US, a major buyer, from the Protocol. 
49 For discussion of the integration of domestic regulatory systems with international emissions trading see 
Kerr (2000c). 
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Many countries have already participated in the Activities Implemented Jointly 
pilot phase.  Thus they are familiar with the domestic institutions required to participate 
in this process.  Those for Track II JI will be similar.  This might make it attractive.  They 
avoid the need to be able to certify their own baselines or monitor emissions from their 
own projects.  They already have focal points designated for giving domestic approval.  
They may be comfortable with the quality of the international certification process.  If 
they do not intend to demonstrate compliance with their targets, they may not be that 
concerned with the true additionality of the credits and the effect of the sales on their 
ability to comply anyway.  In any case, many have hot air that they will be unable to sell 
under JI so they are at little risk of non-compliance unless low environmental integrity JI 
projects happen on a large scale. 
If a country chooses to use projects under IET they must certify baselines and 
verify monitoring themselves.  They could simply copy the international JI process, 
prepare a PDD and hire AIEs to certify and verify.  They would face slightly lower costs 
than under JI if they could avoid costs associated with the Article 6 Supervisory Board.  
Alternatively they could use this system as a base and adjust it to their own requirements.  
Their system could be stricter (because they really bear the environmental liability which 
will be measurable in the national inventory – though not associated with specific 
projects) if they don't have confidence in the international system.  It could be more 
relaxed if they were willing to trade off administrative simplicity, which will encourage 
more projects, with greater risk bearing by government.  In either case it could be better 
adapted to the specific needs of the country.   
If the country chooses to create a non-project-based domestic regulation and 
allow trading on the basis of it, the initial set-up costs would probably be much higher.  
For example, creating an effective domestic tradeable permit system requires both up-
front costs and ongoing monitoring and administration.  These costs would need to be 
weighed against the likely gains both domestically and through international trading.  The 
government could also decide to set up domestic emissions trading in some sectors but 
have project-based reductions in others.   
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(iii)  Uncertainty for the government under IET vs. JI 
Two forms of uncertainty arise.  The first is how many real additional 
reductions a specific project or action creates – how many AAUs the project frees up for 
the government.  A domestic trading system that is well enforced offers complete security 
on this.  It is essentially a large 'project' with a baseline defined as the 'cap'.  The 
government knows exactly how many emissions it will have from the sources covered by 
the trading system.  If the sources choose to reduce emissions even further and sell 
internationally it does not affect the government at all.  These AAUs could be sold as 
soon as the trading system is created and the entities that sell them will be liable under 
domestic law if they are unable to comply with their domestic limitations after they sell 
AAUs.  With any other sort of project (without a fixed cap) there is uncertainty on actual 
emissions until they occur and are monitored.   
Even once monitored, the real reductions from projects will always be 
uncertain because of uncertainty in the baseline.  In a domestic trading system the 
baseline never needs to be formally agreed.  Estimates of it will enter implicitly into 
negotiations on how strict the cap should be and how permits should be allocated across 
sources but it creates no uncertainty for government.  The target is designated in 
emissions levels and so is the cap. 
The second form of uncertainty for government is in national performance.  In 
both JI and IET what ultimately matters for the validity/additionality of credits is national 
performance not performance in any specific project or sector, so this uncertainty is 
identical.  Any JI project (track I or II) is only really valid if the country complies 
overall.
50   
A final issue is about the potential timing of sales under the different systems.  
ERUs can be traded as soon as they are verified.  Project accounting may well move 
faster than national accounting.  If IET could not occur until national accounts were 
finalized, this would be a significant advantage for JI.  However AAUs could be traded 
any time from 2008 onward.  Countries with good monitoring systems will know roughly 
                                                           
50 If a country operates under Track II during the commitment period but by the end of the period has a 
monitoring system that demonstrates that they are out of compliance with their Article 3 commitments, the 
ERUs they created are still valuable but the government is penalised for non-compliance.    
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how many they are likely to have to spare quite quickly.  Legal entities within domestic 
trading systems will also know early on.  Both countries and firms can make fine 
adjustments at the end of the commitment/domestic-regulation period.   
The only real limitation on early trading in IET comes from the commitment 
period reserve.  This is likely to bind strongly only on countries that intend to be out of 
compliance.  These are the targets of the restriction.  For others this might simply alter 
the timing of sales.  Countries that are severely affected by the restrictions on the timing 
of sales could choose to submit projects for verification under Joint Implementation 
Track II to avoid the restriction. 
2  Transaction Costs of each trade under JI (Track II) vs. IET 
The time and cost burden of verifying ERUs through track II will determine the 
desirability of using it for JI projects on a voluntary basis.  Trading under IET would 
likely involve lower transaction costs than JI.  The transaction costs for both include 
finding a trading partner; getting government approval for the trade; meeting any 
international requirements; and monitoring emissions.   
For any IET trade, the identity of the trading partner is irrelevant so this is 
much easier.  It could be done through an anonymous market.  In contrast, in JI the 
partner needs to get approval from their host government and because the ERUs come 
from an identifiable project some partners might have direct concerns about the perceived 
environmental integrity of the project.  This makes matchmaking harder.   
For IET, government approval could be as simple as delegating power in a 
domestic tradeable permit market.  Alternatively it could be a rigorous process of 
baseline setting and verification of emissions before trade if the government uses a 
project-based system and is concerned about the additionality of trades.  In JI, 
government approval will only be complex if the country decides to put additional 
limitations on purchases of ERUs because they do not fully trust the international system 
to protect the environmental integrity of the Protocol or because they have objectives in 
seller countries, such as environmental sustainability, that are not addressed in the Kyoto 
Protocol.  In contrast however, there are no international requirements (as yet) for IET 
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whereas JI projects have to go through the international certification and verification 
process.  
Finally, if IET occurs as an adjunct to a domestic emissions trading system, no 
additional emissions monitoring is needed for international trade.  Monitoring is an 
intrinsic part of the domestic system.  If the IET trade is project-based, monitoring costs 
will be similar to JI if the stringency of the verification is similar to the international 
requirements. Otherwise it could be more or less costly.   
Overall, transaction costs per trade are likely to be much higher under Track II 
JI than under IET that links to a domestic trading system.  The transaction costs under a 
project-based IET system could be either higher or lower than under Track II JI but these 
will be tailored to the needs of the specific country.  If they impose higher transaction 
costs it will be because they want a higher level of certainty about additionality than they 
believe the international rules achieve.  Higher JI transaction costs will reduce the overall 
gains that can be realized under JI.   
3  Public perceptions of environmental integrity 
The most reassuring thing for those who are skeptical of the trading system 
should be compliance with Articles 5 and 7 and then compliance with Article 3.  If a 
seller complies with all three, the environmental integrity of a seller's contribution to the 
agreement is (as far as possible) assured.  If a country or company wants to avoid buying 
'hot air' it should buy only from countries that either cancel their hot air or sell only 
through JI Track II.     
If a buyer chooses to buy from countries that might not be in compliance with 
at least one of 5, 7 and 3, they might be concerned about perceptions of the 
environmental integrity of the units they purchase.  If the seller country is not in 
compliance with 5 and 7, the buyer can buy only through JI Track II so has few choices: 
only to buy or not to buy.  If however, the seller is considered to be at risk of non-
compliance only with 3, the buyer has a choice between purchasing through IET (maybe 
even insisting on project-based credits) or through JI Track II.  They are not legally liable 
for compliance of the countries they purchase from, but might be held morally liable if 
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people think the company/country knows it is purchasing shaky credits.  Track II JI might 
offer some assurance that the ERUs meet certain standards.   
5.1.1.b  Will the country be able to use IET?   
The previous section discussed the pros and cons of IET relative to JI.  A 
country will have this choice only if they comply with Articles 5 and 7.  Each country 
needs to make a decision about how much effort to put into complying with Articles 5 
and 7 by 2008.  Many countries will comply so that they can prove that they have met 
their Kyoto targets.  Others, particularly economies in transition, may find the cost of 
proving compliance high and may not care enough about the international rewards from 
proving Kyoto compliance. 
Compliance might be considered to be a function of capacity but capacity is 
often strongly correlated with willingness to comply.  A country that can make huge 
gains from trading under IET rather than JI will probably be able to find the resources (or 
get their potential buyers to provide them) to build adequate monitoring systems.  If JI is 
seen as an unattractive high-transaction-cost way to trade, those who want to trade, even 
if they have little or no hot air, will want to invest in monitoring systems as a precursor to 
gaining the benefits of IET.  Some will however find it either impossible or not 
worthwhile (probably indistinguishable) to comply by 2008 and will be forced to use JI if 
they want to trade at all.   
5.1.2  When should buyers use one mechanism rather than the other?   
All tradeable units are economically equivalent from the buyer's point of view.  
Buyers should ultimately be willing to pay the market price minus the transaction costs 
they bear.  Higher transaction costs make otherwise equal projects different.  If buyers 
face different transaction costs, they will be willing to pay less for the units that involve 
the higher transaction costs.  JI credits will tend to receive less than AAUs sold directly 
through IET.  If the seller decides to bear the transaction costs, the seller will receive a 
higher price but this should just compensate them for the higher costs they bear (unless 
they are more efficient at managing the trade).  Some domestic governments might put 
restrictions on the number of both JI and CDM credits that can be used domestically in 
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part because of concerns about the environmental integrity of these credits.  These 
restrictions are not yet decided but will affect buyer options.    
Many people believe that in Joint Implementation, the buyer might have a 
greater tendency than in IET to be an investor in the project as well as a simple purchaser 
of ERUs.  If a buyer is an investor as well, they will prefer projects that have lower risk 
as well as lower prices.  Projects in countries with stronger institutions and greater human 
capital will tend to be less risky.   
The role of buyer as investor may however be more a function of the countries 
involved than of the mechanisms themselves.  To reduce emissions efficiently, companies 
in economies in transition may need capital and expertise from more advanced countries 
regardless of the form of trading they might use for the reductions they generate.  Thus 
economies in transition may tend to engage in JI, may be more risky locales for projects, 
and may tend to have active involvement of buyers in projects but these may not be 
directly related.     
5.2  Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism    
5.2.1  What is the difference between the suppliers? 
Joint Implementation will mostly involve economies in transition while the 
Clean Development Mechanism involves developing countries.  Neither of these is a 
homogeneous group.  There are four key differences between the groups.  First, the 
developing countries that will engage in CDM are non-Annex B Parties.  They do not 
have emission reduction or limitation commitments and are not subject to the same 
national inventory, registry and reporting requirements as Annex B Parties.  Even though 
the main participants in JI will not be in compliance with these requirements (those who 
can use Track II only) they might be expected to be working toward compliance.  Second, 
the economies in transition are expected to want to behave in the near future like other 
Annex B parties that have strong monitoring systems and truly binding limits.  Many are 
candidates for accession to the EU.  Most aspire to be considered equal to developed 
OECD countries.  They might be concerned about creating a reputation for compliance.  
Third, the potential scale of CDM provision from developing countries is much higher so 
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any problems in implementation will be magnified.  Fourth, the ability of the government 
to design and effectively implement regulations without risk of corruption or 
incompetence varies both between and within groups.  Developing countries may be 
generally less capable however, some 'developing countries' have advanced strong 
governments while some economies in transition have relatively weak governments.   
These differences have motivated different international rules and will also affect the 
level of supply (and possibly demand) for CERs relative to ERUs. 
5.2.2  How are the international rules different?  
Although both JI and the CDM are project-based mechanisms and are subject 
to similar additionality requirements under the Kyoto Protocol, these mechanisms and 
their governing rules are different.  The Protocol requires that CDM projects achieve the 
dual purpose of assisting non-Annex B Parties (i.e., developing countries) in achieving 
sustainable development and contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, 
and of helping Annex B Parties to meet a portion of their Article 3 commitment.   
Under the CDM, eligible project activities exclude avoided deforestation and 
the 'land use, land use change and forestry' (LULUCF) activities defined in Article 3.4.  
The only eligibility requirement for non-Annex BParties to host CDM projects is 
ratification of the Protocol. The governance of the CDM is similar to the Track II 
governance of ERU verification by the Article 6 Supervisory Committee, but involves 
different bodies. A ten-member CDM Executive Board governs the registration of CDM 
projects and the certification of their emission reductions.  In-depth project review for 
validation and verification of emission reductions is undertaken by Designated 
Operational Entities (DOEs).   
JI projects can begin as early as 2000 but ERUs can be issued only for 
activities undertaken after the beginning of 2008.  The Article 6 Supervisory Committee 
will not be appointed until the first meeting of the COP/MOP following entry into force 
of the Protocol. Once the Supervisory Committee has been appointed, it will take time to 
finalize the rulemaking for verifying ERUs under track II.  In contrast, the CDM was 
designed to start generating CERs as early as the year 2000.  The first CDM Executive 
Board was appointed immediately after the approval of the Marrakesh Accords, and 
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launched into designing the accreditation process for DOEs and developing the project 
design document and baseline guidelines.  At the time of this writing, the CDM 
Executive Board was preparing to approve the accreditation of DOEs and begin 
registering the first CDM projects.   
The different governance structures, and underlying that, different levels of 
trust of sellers and different concern about the potential scale of implementation 
problems, will have a major effect on the relative transaction costs borne by CDM 
projects relative to JI projects.  The CDM process involves more subjective issues and 
may be more political.  It could involve longer time lags and a greater demand for 
substantiation of project claims (e.g.:  baselines, monitoring and sustainability).  In 
addition the direct costs payable for international certification are likely to be different.  
The JI payment sharing rules are not yet defined.  Under the CDM, project participants 
will have to pay fees to the DOEs to get their projects validated and their CERs verified.   
In addition, a share of the proceeds from CDM projects (2%) must be applied to support 
adaptation activities in non-Annex B countries.  An additional share, as yet undecided, 
will be taken to cover the administrative costs of the CDM.  Transaction costs might be 
much higher in the CDM than under JI.   
5.2.3  Should buyers treat these mechanisms differently in practice? 
As discussed above buyers should only treat units differently if they have 
different transaction costs or if buyers are restricted in the use of one type of tradeable 
unit.  CDM credits may well face the highest transaction costs of all the mechanisms so 
the sellers will tend to receive less than the market price.  Buyers are restricted by the 
international rules in their use of CDM credits (e.g.:  for LULUCF credits
51) and 
individual countries may put on other limitations.  Where buyers are involved as 
investors in the project and bear project risks they will take into account the relative 
riskiness of different project partners.  They might find some developing countries highly 
risky while others are relatively good risks.  Similarly they will have different attitudes to 
risk in different economies in transition.  It is hard to say how the 'average' risk will vary 
across the two groups.     
                                                           
51 There is a cap on each Annex I country's use of CDM LULUCF credits equal to 1% of base year 
emissions times 5. 
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5.3  The joint market for AAUs, ERUs and CERs 
The market price for tradeable units will be set by demand and supply.  If 
demand rises the price will rise; if supply rises the price will fall.  All countries will have 
emissions abatement opportunities ranging from near zero cost to extremely high cost.  
Their marginal reduction should cost the same as the market price net of transaction 
costs.  Thus no instrument intrinsically offers 'cheaper reductions'.  However the marginal 
cost curve for reductions will be more elastic in some countries and the total level of 
emissions and hence potential scale of reductions varies enormously.   
Many people argue that because economies in transition are currently very 
inefficient and because they have high levels of capital turnover (because their stock is so 
old) they have a flatter cost curve and hence large numbers of cheap emission reduction 
opportunities.  Developing countries may have similar opportunities – they are also 
extremely large in terms of population and at least some (e.g. China) have high growth so 
high levels of new investment.  In addition, Russia in particular has a lot of 'hot air', 
which is essentially zero cost tradeable units.  Thus the supply of ERUs (and possibly 
AAUs from economies in transition) and CERs is potentially huge and could lower the 
market price enormously.  How much this potential can be realized depends partly on the 
monitoring requirements and transactions costs involved in the mechanisms.  Given the 
impossibility of estimating accurate baselines, few projects would actually be feasible if 
Parties were unwilling to risk some loss of environmental integrity.  If some economies in 
transition can comply with Articles 5 and 7, they can sell their hot air and also avoid the 
transaction costs involved in JI; this would greatly increase their supply.  
Realizing this potentially large supply also depends partly on the inherent 
difficulties in investing in technology change in countries with relatively undeveloped 
institutions and economic systems.  It is not chance that these countries have less efficient 
technology and high emissions per unit output.  Changing that is not easy and may not be 
as cheap as engineering models suggest.  Foreign investment in both economies in 
transition and also many developing countries is challenging for reasons that have 
nothing to do with climate change regulation.   
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All these uncertainties, as well as the inherent difficulty of modeling the future, 
means that the actual level of market price is extremely hard to predict.  Model estimates 
vary widely but real uncertainty may be greater still as models find it difficult to account 
for transaction costs or weak legal institutions that deter investment.   
All this discussion assumes that the market operates competitively.  Unless 
countries devolve a lot of the trading to legal entity level (as the EU seems to be moving 
to do) trading will have a strongly political aspect.  This might make ERUs more valuable 
because countries prefer to pay money to countries they are comfortable giving aid to.  
Conversely it might make them less valuable if ERUs are seen to be less environmentally 
sound because of problems with baselines and monitoring and concern about future 
commitments of economies in transition.  Political influence might limit buying of CERs 
for similar reasons.  Pressures to show serious efforts to reduce domestic emissions 
(partly motivated by the desire to reduce the need to buy in future) might reduce demand 
even though domestic reductions are much more expensive than even genuine reductions 
elsewhere.  These political influences are hard to predict.   
6  CONCLUSION – FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
We have laid out the current international rules and key outstanding issues.  
Many questions still remain.  Some require detailed knowledge of specific projects and 
industries and of the monitoring data involved so are not ideal for economic research.  
Many, however, could be informed by good economic research.  Here we suggest some 
research directions on baselines, leakage and the general benefits from trading.   
JI advocates and international regulators tend to focus on accounting methods 
to generate baselines.  As economists we know that they have serious flaws.  Our 
experience with domestic environmental regulation tells us that regulators are unlikely to 
ever have good information on firm level behaviour.  We believe it would be worth 
seriously exploring the possibility of using incentive mechanisms to encourage self-
revelation of unbiased baselines by firms in the way that tradeable permit markets 
encourage revelation of abatement costs.  Some preliminary work has been done but 
much remains.  This research needs to have strong theoretical foundations, good 
  38 
connections to the nature of the actors and the problems, and probably needs empirical 
support.  Any solutions would have to be simple and practical. 
Useful empirical work could be done on estimating baselines, and comparing 
different formulations (varying by scale, updating and basic methodology) with out-of-
sample experience.
52  Evaluating the bias in actual baselines submitted to the Article 6 
Supervisory Committee and working out how much could be ascribed to strategic 
behaviour also would be useful.  The research could be done using historical data in areas 
with no JI projects. 
The problem of measuring leakage would be ameliorated by good empirical 
work.  Identifying the key paths of leakage in different types of project and summarising 
our experience about their likely scale and on what that scale depends would be useful.  
Some research could draw together existing estimates of key elasticities from the 
literature with careful documentation of where and how they apply.  In some cases we do 
not have estimates of key elasticities, or we have them only in developed countries such 
as the US.  Elasticities may not translate well from developed to developing countries or 
to economies in transition.  These could be estimated.  The aim could be to develop 
standard methodologies for specific types of projects or to create rules of thumb about 
when leakage is and is not material.     
A final area of useful research that people do not commonly associate with this 
area would involve the economics of foreign investment.  What can we learn from the 
literature or from existing experience about the barriers to investment, and especially 
foreign investment, in economies in transition.  How much impact are they likely to have 
on the efficiency of the mechanisms?  In what ways might JI or IET reduce these 
barriers? Could their design be changed to enhance this?  Although there is currently very 
little JI action, there are plenty of investments, or non-investments, in the sectors that will 
be involved that could provide qualitative and quantitative data.   
 
 
                                                           
52 See for example, Kerr et al (2003) for discussion of deforestation baselines in the CDM. 
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